7th edition
Aristotle

1. If our activities have some end which we want for its own sake, and for the sake of
which we want all the other ends, what is that end? Why don’t we choose everything for
the sake of something else? (p. 197)
2. What is the highest of all practical goods? With what is it identified? (p. 198)
3. What do the masses seem to believe the Good is? (p. 198)
4. With what do cultured people identify the Good? What is problematic with this answer
according to Aristotle? (p. 198)
5. What might one be inclined to suppose is the end (rather than honor) pursued in public
life? Why does this appear to be somewhat deficient as an end? (p. 198)
6. Why is wealth obviously not the good that we are seeking? (p. 199)
7. Given the good appears to vary and is one thing in medicine and another in strategy,
what is it (the good) then in every action and pursuit? What then is obvious about this
supreme good? (p. 199)
8. What then is thought to be just such an end? Why? How is it different than honor,
pleasure, intelligence and good qualities generally? (p. 199)
9. What does Aristotle mean when he claims the perfect good is self-sufficient? What do
we take a self-sufficient thing to be? Why does happiness satisfy these two criteria
(perfect and self-sufficient)? (p. 199 – 200)
10. What is happiness? (p. 200)
11. What can we assume about human beings given we can see that eye and hand and
foot have some function? In what part of the human being can we find his or her
function? What parts must we exclude? (p. 200)
12. How does Aristotle come to the conclusion that the good for man is an activity of the
soul in accordance with virtue? (p. 200)
13. What is the further qualification on this conclusion? (p. 201)
14. How has happiness been described? What are all the other goods? What is the end of
political science? And the chief concern of this science? (p. 201)
15. What does any kind of excellence render that of which it is the excellence? How do
the examples of the eye and the horse illustrate this? What follows then about human
excellence? (p. 201 – 202)
16. What does Aristotle mean by virtue? With what is this virtue concerned? What is the
mark of virtue? At what does virtue aim? (p. 202)
17. Virtue is a mean between what two vices? (p. 204)
18. What should anyone who is aiming at the mean do? Why? What must we notice?
How shall we arrive at the mean? (p. 204)
19. With what does the happy life seem to live in accordance? What does such a life
imply? In what does such a life not consist? (p. 206)
20. If happiness is an activity in accordance with virtue, what is it reasonable to assume?
21. Why is contemplation the highest form of activity? (p. 206)
22. Why would contemplation seem to be the only activity that is appreciated for its own
sake? (p. 207)
23. What is best and most pleasant for any given creature? What is the best and most
pleasant life for man? Why? (p. 207)

MacIntyre

1. What does any contemporary attempt to envisage each human life as a whole, as a
unity, encounter? (p. 233)
2. What is the tendency in analytical philosophy that presents philosophical obstacles? (p.
233)
3. What is the tendency at home in both sociological theory and in existentialism that
presents philosophical obstacles? (p. 233-234)
4. What is the liquidation of the self? What does it allow no scope for? Why? How is the unity of a virtue in someone’s life intelligible? To define the pre-modern concept of the virtues with which MacIntyre has been preoccupied, what has it become necessary to do? (p. 234)
5. The example of the man “digging,” “gardening,” “taking exercise,” etc. is meant to show what? (p. 234 – 235)
6. What cannot we do with regard to characterizing behavior? (p. 235)
7. What is central to the notion of a setting? (p. 235)
8. What do we need to know, where intentions are concerned? (p. 235)
9. What does the argument imply about the interrelationships of the intentional, the social and the historical? What turns out to be the basic and essential genre for the characterization of human action? (p. 236)
10. What is the basic character of action? Why? What central thesis begins to emerge from this? (p. 236)
11. How do we enter human society? It is through hearing stories about what, that children learn or mislearn both what a child and what a parent is, what the cast of characters may be in the drama into which they have been born and what the ways of the world are? What happens if you deprive children of such stories? What then is at the heart of things? The telling of stories has a key part in what? (p. 236 – 237)
12. What is it to be the subject of a narrative that runs from one’s birth to one’s death? (p. 237)
13. In what does the unity of an individual life consist? (p. 237)
14. What is it to ask, what is the good for me? (p. 237)
15. What is it to ask, what is the good for man? (p. 237)
16. What provides the moral life with its unity? What is the unity of a human life? (p. 237 – 238)
17. What is necessary for any beginning to a quest? What conception is required? (p. 238)
18. How am I never able to seek for the good or exercise the virtues? (p. 238)
19. How do we all approach our own circumstances? What follows as to what is good for me? What do I inherit? What in part gives my life its own moral particularity? (p. 238 – 239)
20. How does the thought that one belongs to a clan, tribe or nation appear from the standpoint of modern individualism? What are the implications of such individualism? What are the examples MacIntyre gives involving Americans, Englishmen and Germans? (p. 239)
21. In what is the story of my life always embedded? What deforms my present relationships? What coincides? (p. 239)
22. The fact that the self has to find its moral identity in and through its membership in communities does not entail what? It is in moving forward from such particularity that the search for what consists? In moving forward in this way, what can never be left behind? What is the illusion that we (and Kant according to MacIntyre) suffer from? (p. 239)
23. In what is the history of each of our own lives generally and characteristically embedded? (p. 240)
28. What sustains and strengthens traditions? What weakens and destroys them? What do lack of justice, lack of truthfulness, lack of courage, lack of the relevant intellectual virtues do? To recognize the answer to the previous question is to recognize the existence of what additional virtue? (p. 241)

8th edition
Aristotle

1. If our activities have some end which we want for its own sake, and for the sake of which we want all the other ends, what is that end? Why don’t we choose everything for the sake of something else? (p. 253)
2. What is the highest of all practical goods? With what is it identified? (p. 254)
3. What do the masses seem to believe the Good is? (p. 254)
4. With what do cultured people identify the Good? What is problematic with this answer according to Aristotle? (p. 254)
5. What might one be inclined to suppose is the end (rather than honor) pursued in public life? Why does this appear to be somewhat deficient as an end? (p. 254)
6. Why is wealth obviously not the good that we are seeking? (p. 254-255)
7. Given the good appears to vary and is one thing in medicine and another in strategy, what is it (the good) then in every action and pursuit? What then is obvious about this supreme good? (p. 255)
8. What then is thought to be just such an end? Why? How is it different than honor, pleasure, intelligence and good qualities generally? (p. 255)
9. What does Aristotle mean when he claims the perfect good is self-sufficient? What do we take a self-sufficient thing to be? Why does happiness satisfy these two criteria (perfect and self-sufficient)? (p. 255-256)
10. What is happiness? (p. 256)
11. What can we assume about human beings given we can see that eye and hand and foot have some function? In what part of the human being can we find his or her function? What parts must we exclude? (p. 256)
12. How does Aristotle come to the conclusion that the good for man is an activity of the soul in accordance with virtue? (p. 256)
13. What is the further qualification on this conclusion? (p. 256)
14. How has happiness been described? What are all the other goods? What is the end of political science? And the chief concern of this science? (p. 257)
15. What does any kind of excellence render that of which it is the excellence? How do the examples of the eye and the horse illustrate this? What follows then about human excellence? (p. 257)
16. What does Aristotle mean by virtue? With what is this virtue concerned? What is the mark of virtue? At what does virtue aim? (p. 257-258)
17. Virtue is a mean between what two vices? (p. 259)
18. What should anyone who is aiming at the mean do? Why? What must we notice? How shall we arrive at the mean? (p. 260)
19. With what does the happy life seem to live in accordance? What does such a life imply? In what does such a life not consist? (p. 261)
20. If happiness is an activity in accordance with virtue, what is it reasonable to assume? (p. 262)
21. Why is contemplation the highest form of activity? (p. 262)
22. Why would contemplation seem to be the only activity that is appreciated for its own sake? (p. 262)
23. What is best and most pleasant for any given creature? What is the best and most pleasant life for man? Why? (p. 263)

MacIntyre
1. What does any contemporary attempt to envisage each human life as a whole, as a unity, encounter? (p. 287)
2. What is the tendency in analytical philosophy that presents philosophical obstacles? (p. 287)
3. What is the tendency at home in both sociological theory and in existentialism that presents philosophical obstacles? (p. 287)
4. What is the liquidation of the self? What does it allow no scope for? Why? How is the unity of a virtue in someone’s life intelligible? To define the pre-modern concept of the virtues with which MacIntyre has been preoccupied, what has it become necessary to do? (p. 287 - 288)
5. The example of the man “digging,” “gardening,” “taking exercise,” etc. is meant to show what? (p. 288)
6. What cannot we do with regard to characterizing behavior? (p. 289)
7. What is central to the notion of a setting? (p. 289)
8. What do we need to know, where intentions are concerned? (p. 289)
9. What does the argument imply about the interrelationships of the intentional, the social and the historical? What turns out to be the basic and essential genre for the characterization of human action? (p. 289 - 290)
10. What is the basic character of action? Why? What central thesis begins to emerge from this? (p. 290)
11. What question must I answer in order to answer the question “What am I to do?” How do we enter human society? It is through hearing stories about what, that children learn or mislearn both what a child and what a parent is, what the cast of characters may be in the drama into which they have been born and what the ways of the world are? What happens if you deprive children of such stories? What then is at the heart of things? The telling of stories has a key part in what? (p. 290)
12. What is it to be the subject of a narrative that runs from one’s birth to one’s death? (p. 290)
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14. What is it to ask, what is the good for me? (p. 291)
15. What is it to ask, what is the good for man? (p. 291)
16. What provides the moral life with its unity? What is the unity of a human life? (p. 291)
17. What is necessary for any beginning to a quest? What conception is required? (p. 291)
18. It is in looking for what that we initially define the kind of life, which is a quest for the good? (p. 291)
19. What is the medieval conception of a quest? What isn’t the medieval conception of a quest? (p. 291 - 292)
20. The virtues then are to be understood as those dispositions, which will sustain us in what? By doing what? (p. 292)
21. What is the provisional conclusion about the good life for man at which we have arrived? (p. 292)
22. How am I never able to seek for the good or exercise the virtues? (p. 292)
23. How do we all approach our own circumstances? What follows as to what is good for me? What do I inherit? What in part gives my life its own moral particularity? (p. 292)
24. How does the thought that one belongs to a clan, tribe or nation appear from the standpoint of modern individualism? What are the implications of such individualism? What are the examples MacIntyre gives involving Americans, Englishmen and Germans? (p. 292 - 293)
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26. The fact that the self has to find its moral identity in and through its membership in communities does not entail what? It is in moving forward from such particularity that
the search for what consists? In moving forward in this way, what can never be left behind? What is the illusion that we (and Kant according to MacIntyre) suffer from? (p. 293)

27. In what is the history of each of our own lives generally and characteristically embedded? (p. 294)

28. What sustains and strengthen traditions? What weakens and destroys them? What do lack of justice, lack of truthfulness, lack of courage, lack of the relevant intellectual virtues do? To recognize the answer to the previous question is to recognize the existence of what additional virtue? (p. 294)