1. What is ethnocentricism? Of what do we condemn it as a variety? What then does it behoove us to do? (p. 165)
2. To what has the rejection of ethnocentricism in the West led us? (p. 165)
3. What is ethical relativism? (p. 165)
4. What is the argument we can derive from Ladd’s account of ethical relativism? What is the first premise? The second premise? The conclusion? (p. 166)
5. What is the first thesis of the argument? What kind of thesis is it? With what is it identified? (p. 166)
6. What is the second thesis of the argument? What does it assert? (p. 166)
7. What would trying to see things from an independent, non-cultural point of view be like? What kind of beings are we? (p. 166)
8. What can the nonrelativist accept? How do Orientals and Occidentals illustrate this? How do drivers in Great Britain and those in the rest of Europe and the U.S. illustrate this? What is different and what the same? What must the ethical relativist maintain? (p. 166-167)
9. In what are social values grounded? What then is morality? Of what are these codes of behavior the outcomes? On what does every morality depend? (p. 167)
10. From what does the conclusion of the argument follow? What yields ethical relativism in its classic form? (p. 167)
11. What is the sorry consequence of moral subjectivism? Why? What could turn out to be the case with regard to Hitler and Gandhi on the basis of Subjectivism? What happens to notions of moral good and bad, right or wrong? (p. 168)
12. What is the contradiction between Subjectivism and the concept of morality? With what does morality have to do? What is its minimal aim? How does subjectivism treat individuals? What belies this atomistic view of personality? (p. 168 – 169)
13. What does anthropologist Herskovits argue? What is the argument? The first premise? The second premise? The conclusion? (p. 169)
14. But if morality is relative to each culture what if the culture does not have a principle of tolerance? What does Herskovits seem to be doing? (p. 169)
15. Who cannot the relativists rationally criticize? What is the result as regards Hitler and Mother Teresa? (p. 170)
16. What does ethical relativism seem to entail about reformers? What examples does Pojman use to illustrate this? (p. 170)
17. What is an even more basic problem with the notion that morality is dependent on cultural acceptance for its validity? What has morality lost as a result? (p. 170 – 171)
18. Even if Cultural Relativism is a fact, what does it not establish? Why? (p. 172)
19. On the other hand, what does a denial of Cultural Relativism not disprove? Why? What follows then about the first premise? (p. 172)
21. What does the relativist need? (p. 173)
22. Even if we are not able to know with certainty that our moral beliefs are closer to the truth than those of another culture or those of others within our own culture, does it follow that we are not justified in believing that they are? Why if we take such a stand do we not commit the fallacy of ethnocentrism? (p. 173)

23. What has Pojman argued? (p. 173)

24. Who’s to judge right or wrong? On what basis? (p. 173)